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79-448 Reid v. Georgia 
MR. JUSTICE POWEll, concurrinq.* 
This case is similar in many respects to United 
States v. Mendenhall, U.S. ____ (May 27, 19RO). The 
defendant in that case also was stopped by DEA aqents at an 
airport for identification, she thereafter accompanied the 
agents to their office for auestioninq, and was searched 
there. The case presented a number of auestions, and 
Justices here expressed divergent views on some of them. 
The threshold question in Mendenhall, as in this 
case, was whether there was a "seizure" within the meaninq of 
* I aqree, on the basis of the fraqmentary facts apparently 
relied upon by the DEA aqents in this case, there was no 
justification for a "seizure". 
2. 
the Fourth Amendment when the aqents initially stopped the 
defendant only for the purpose of asking identification 
auestions. Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice 
Rehnauist, concluded that the mere stopping of a person for 
identification purposes was not a seizure so lonq as the 
individual could walk away: 
"We conclude that a person who has been 'seized' 
within the meanina of the Fourth Amendment only if, 
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, a rea.sonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave." Slip op. at 9.* 
*r.otr. Justice Stewart also noted that "[t~ nothing in the 
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing 
questions to anyone on the streets." I~., at 7, auotinq 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s., at 34 (~Jhite,J., concurrina). 
3. 
On the basis of facts that were remarkably similar to those 
in the present case, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that there was no seizure. 
Three other Justices, in a concurrinq opinion in 
Mendenhall, did not consider it necessary to decide whether 
there had been a seizure. It was their view that even 
assuming that the stop ~id constitute a seizure, the DEA 
}. 
•' 
agents had articulable and reasonable grounds for suspicion 
that t.he individual who had deplaned from an airplane was 
engaging in criminal activity. They therefore did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping such person for 
routine questioning. 





disaqree with the views of Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. 
Justice Pehnouist. SliP. op., at , n. 1.* 
As the Supreme Court of Georqia dP.ci~P-d this 
caseprior to this Court's decision in Mendenhall, it did not 
consjder whether in fact there had been any seizure of the 
petitioner. Rather, it assumed that the stop for routine 
identification questioni~ constitueo a sPizure, and 
addressed its opinion to the question whether this 
nevertheless was iustified by arituculable and rPasonable 
arounds of suspicion. 
*Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice BrPnnan, Mr. 
Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting 
opinion in Mendenhall in which they concluded that there had 
been a seizure, and that there were not insufficient qrounds 
to justify it. 
s. 
As the initial seizure issue was not considered by 
the courts below, it is open for them on remand to address it 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurrinq. 1 
This case is similar in many respects to United 
States v. ~endenhall, ~u.s. ____ (May 27, 1980), in which 
a defendant observed walkin9 through an airport was stopped 
by DEA aaents and asked for identification. The threshold 
auestion in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the aaent's 
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the 
meaninq of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Stewart, joined 
by Mr. Justice Rehnouist, was of the opinion that the mere 
stoppin9 of a person for identification purposes is not a 
seizure: 
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within 
the meaninq of the Fourth Amendment only if, in 
iew of all of the circumstances _ surroundina the 
incident, a reasonable person would have belie~ed 
that he was not free to leave." Slip op. at 9. 
(/Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in 
the present case, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice 
2. 
Rehnquist decided that no seizure had occurred. 
My concurrina opinion in ~P.ndenhall, joined by the 
-:::: 
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun, did not consider the 
seizure issue because it had not been raised in the courts 
below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was my 
view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable 
grounds for believinq that the individual was engaged in 
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment by stoppinq that person for routine 
auestioninq without regard to resolution of the seizure 
auestion. I expressly stated, however, that my decision not 
to reach the seizure issue did not necessarily indicate 
disagreement with the views of Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. 
, n. 1. 3 Just ice Rehnqu ist. Slip ~ op •
1
, at 
The state courts, which decided this case before 
our decision in Mendenhall, djd not consider whether the 
petitioner had been sejzed c Rather, those courts apparently 
assumed that the stop for routine identification questioning 
constitfa a seizure, and addressed only the · question whether 
the aaent's actions were justified by arefjculable and 
reasonable arounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not 
consider the initial seizure question in our decision today, 
that issue remains open for consideration by the state courts 
in liaht of the opinions in ~endenhall. 
3 0 
FOOTNOTES 
1. I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts 
apparently relied upon by the DEA agents in this case, there 
was no justification for a "seizur~' / 
2. Mr. Justice Stewart also noted that "' [t]here 
is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman 
from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.'" .!_£., 
at 7, auotinq Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s., at 34 (White, J., 
concurring). See also ante, at n.2. -
3. Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice 
Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshal) and Mr. Justice Stevens, filed 
a dissentina opinion in MendenDall in which they concluned 
that t.ber€! had b~~R a se!i:~aa:=~, and tl:lilt tl:lel'e \!Hiilr€! Re-t 
il'\al:lffieieRt efi01:1Fl:6'1:? to ju•ti:fy it. ~ ~flfi,(JJ huR.. ~ 
tf.t ~'tviJ ;;1 u;~/a~ PF liP ~r1i_ /lm~meJ-. 
To: T'-'r- (' ,, ··f ,Just1Cl:i 
M1 \('.P BI"9llnan 
Mr . Joe Ste•art 
llr ... White 
r ··:·,rsball 
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OF GEORGIA 
No. 79-448. Decided June -, 1980 
MR. JusTICE PoWJo}LL, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN J 
joi~ concurring.1 
This case is similar in many respects to United States v~ 
Mendenhall, - U. S. - (May 27, 1980) , in which a de-
fendant observed walking through an airport was stopped 
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold 
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's 
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART, 
joined by MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that 
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is 
not a seizure: 
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all 
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason-
able person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave." Slip op., at 9.2 
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in 
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. J usTICE 
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred. 
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall, joined by THE 
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con-
1 I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon 
by tlw DEA agf'nt:; in thi~ case, there was no ju~tifi ration for a "seizure." 
~MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWART also noted that "' [t]here is nothing in the 
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing que:;tions to 
anyone on the streets.'" /d ., at 7, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 
34 (WHI'l't.:, J ., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2. 
!tEl~ v. OEO!tOtA 
sider the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the 
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was 
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable 
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in 
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning 
without regard to resolution of the seizure question. I ex-
pressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the 
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with 
the views of MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHN-
QUIST. Slip op., at -, n. 1.8 
The state courts, which decided this case before our deci-
sion in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner 
had been seized. Rather. those courts apparently assumed 
that the stop for routine identification questioning consti-
tuted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the 
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable 
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider 
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue 
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of' 
the opinions in Mendenhall. 
3 MR. Jus-rtcl!: WHI'J'E, joined by MR. Jus'I'ICE BRENNAN, MR. Jus'riCE 
MARSHALL, and MR. .Jus•ncE STEVENS, filed a dis:;enting opinion in I 
Mendenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had been de:-
tained in violation of the Fotlt'th Arm:n<Inreat .. 
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Jusna= 
MR. JusTICE PoWJo}LL, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN } 1...--~---­
j~ concurring.1 
This case is similar in many respects to United States v. 
Mendenhall, - U. S. - (May 27, 1980), in which a de-
fendant observed walking through an airport was stopped 
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold 
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's 
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART, 
joined by MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that 
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is 
not a seizure: 
11We conclude that a person has been 1seized' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all 
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason-
able person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave." Slip op., at 9.2 
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in 
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE 
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred. 
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall, joined by THE 
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con-
1 I agree, on the basis o{ the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon 
by the DEA agE-nt:; in this casE>, there was no justification for a "seizure." 
2 MR. JUSTICE STEWAR'l' also noted that " '[t]here is nothing in the 
Constitution which prevents n policeman from addressing que;tions to 
anyone on the streets.'" ld., at 7, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 
34 (WHITE, J., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2. 
L. ) 
ltEID v. ~'tEOIWIA 
sider the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the 
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was 
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable 
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in 
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning 
!WttbOllt IE!t§AI El te Feseht6ieft of tfle seiettre qttes6iaR. I ex-
pressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the 
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with 
the views of MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHN-
QUIST. Slip op., at - , n. 1.8 
The state courts, which decided this case before our deci-
sion in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner 
had been seized. Rather. those courts apparently assumed 
that the stop for routine identification questioning consti-
tuted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the 
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable 
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider 
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue 
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of 
the opinions in Mendenhall. 
3 MR. Jus•ncE Wlfl'l'E, joined by MR. Jus1'ICE BRENNAN, MR. JusTICE' 
MARSHALL, nnd MR. Jus•ncE STEVENs, filed a dissenting opinion in 
Mendenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had be.en de.-
tained in violatiQn of the Fourth Arr~ub:neut~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm ----
TOMMY REID, JR. v. STATE OF GEORGIA 
ON PKTITION FOR WRIT OF CI<.:RTIORARI TO THE COURT OF' APPKAL8 
01<' GEORGIA 
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MR. JusTICJ<~ Pow~-:LL, with whom MR. JusTlCK BLACKMUN/ ~ ~ f j G ( 
join , concurring.1 V UJ 
This case is similar in many respects to United States v. JtAJd 
Mendenhall, - U. S. - (May 27, 1980) , in which a de-
fendant observed walking through an airport was stopped 
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold 
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's 
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART, 
joined by MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that 
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is 
not a seizure: 
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all 
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason-
able person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave." Slip op., at 9.2 
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in 
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE 
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred. 
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall, joined by THE 
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con-
1 I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon 
by thr DEA ugf-'nt:< in thi,: r·asr, tlwrP was uo ju:;tifi<·atiou for a ""Pizure." 
~ Mu. JusTICE S•rEWAn'l' also noted that "'[t]hcre is nothing in the 
Constitution which prevents :L policeman from uddrel>~ing questions to 
anyone on the strPets.'" /d ., at 7, quoting 'I'erry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 
34 (WHI'l't.:, J ., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2. 
ltEUJ v. (j EOltG!A 
sidm· the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the 
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizur·e, it was 
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable 
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in 
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning 
urjthou* regard ts rsse'ro· p , sjzpse qnszo;cn. I ex-
pressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the 
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with 
the views of MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHN-
QUIST. Slip op., a.t -, n. 1.~ 
The state courts, which decided this case before our deci-
sion in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner 
ha(I been sei11f'd. Rather. those courts apparent]y assumed 
that the stop for routine identification questioning consti-
tuted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the 
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable 
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider 
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue 
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of 
the opinions in Mendenhall. 
8 MH. Jus•rrc1~ WHI'J'J::, joined by MH. Jus•rrc~:: BRJ::NNAN , MH . Jus•rrc~ 
MAHSHALL, and MR. .Jus·ncJ:: STEVENS, filed a di:;:;enting opinion in 
Mnulenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had ~n de_-
tuincd in violation of the Fourth Armmdmem .. 
To: TllC Br~n.'.':lll 
.Ju~t · ) Mr. st .. ,., r· ~. 
Mr . ,}Uti t' C' 
ur. 1U"'~ ,• i 
,. ' ·n 
'.11' l·' i st . 
Mr .. 1 ,1 c~.ns 
p0 well 
From : Mr · ~ \lj~Q 
\JU~ 'l. --
6-24-80 Circulated: -
1st PRINTED DRAFT Recirculated: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm 
TOMMY REID, JR. v. STATE OF GEORGIA 
ON P~TITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COUHT 01<' APP~AL8 
01<' GEORGIA 
No. 79-448. Decided Jm.,.le __ , _19-80-------t-,;, ~ e hit:F 
MH. JusTic•~ Pow~-:LL, with whom iR. JusTIC~ BLACKMUN l .,..,-.-- ,....-
joii , concurring.1 --;- J V .5 f i C c,. 
This case is similar in many respects to Un:ited States v. lJ LJ ... \ A 
Mendenhall, - u. s. - (May 27, 1980) , in which a de- r· IV v~ 
fendant observed walking through an airport was stopped 
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold 
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's 
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JusTICE STEWART, 
joined by MH. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that 
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is 
not a seizure: 
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all 
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason-
able person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave." Slip op., at 9.2 
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in 
the present case, MR. J u sTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE 
REHNQUIST decided that no seizure had occurred. 
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall , joined by THE 
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con-
1 I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon 
by til(' DEA ugent :-: in thi~ ra:sf•, tlwrP wus no ju:::tifi('atiou for a "~Pizure . " 
~ Mn. JusTin; Sn~WAH'r also noted that "' [t]here is nothing in the 
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addre:;:;ing questions to 
anyone on the streets.'" ld., at 7, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 
34 (WHI'l'B, J ., concuning). See also ante, at n. 2. 
ltEtfi v. ~EOIWIA 
sicler the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the 
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was 
my view that the DEA agents had articulable and reasonable 
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in 
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning 
woltbont l'll~611rii h IPIIIJOJ,tion gf the §eizms 'if!IBIJtiWt. I ex-
pressly stated, however, that my decision not to reach the 
seizure issue did not necessarily indicate disagreement with 
the views of MR. JusTICJo} STEWART and Ma. JusTICE REHN-
QUIST. Slip op., a.t -, n. 1.~ 
The state courts, which decided this case before our deci-
sion in Mendenhall, diu not consider whether the petitioner 
had been seil'-ed. Rather. those courts apparently assumed 
that the stop for routine identification questioning consti-
tuted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the 
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable 
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider 
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue 
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of 
the opinions in Mendenhall. 
a MH. JuS'rrcr; WHI'i'E, joined by MH. Jus•ncE BHENNAN, MH. Jus•ncE 
MAHSHALL, and MH. .JusncF; STEV!!:NS, filed a di::;senting opinion in 
Me1ulenhall in which they concluded tha.t the respondent had be.en de.-
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MH. JusTICE PowELL;, with whom THE CHIEF JuBTICE and 
Mu. JuBTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring.1 
This case is similar in many respects to United States v. 
Mendenhall, -- U. S. - (May '27, 1980), in which a de~ 
fendant observed walking through an airport was stopped 
by DEA agents and asked for identification. The threshold 
question in Mendenhall, as here, was whether the agent's 
initial stop of the suspect constituted a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. MR. JuS'l'ICE STEWART, 
joined by Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST, was of the opinion that 
the mere stopping of a person for identification purposes is 
not a seizure: 
"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all 
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reason~ 
able person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave." Slip op. , at 9.2 
Thus, on the basis of facts remarkably similar to those in 
the present case, MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE 
REHNQUIS'l' decided that no seizure had occurred. 
My concurring opinion in Mendenhall, joined by THE 
CHIEF JusTICE and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, did not con~ 
1 I agree, on the basis of the fragmentary facts apparently relied upon 
by the DEA agent;; in this ca~e, that there was uo ju~:;tifica.tion for a 
"seizure." 
2 MH. JusTICE S·rEWAH'r also noted tha.t "'[t]here is nothing in the 
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addres::;ing questions to 
anyone on the streets.'" Jd., a.t 7, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 
34 (WHITE, J., concurring). See also ante, at n. 2. 
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sider the seizure issue because it had not been raised in the 
courts below. Even if the stop constituted a seizure, it was 
my view that the DEA agents had articulable aud reasonable 
grounds for believing that the individual was engaged in 
criminal activity. Therefore, they did not violatP the Fourth 
Amendment by stopping that person for routine questioning 
I expressly stated, however, that my uecision uot to reach the 
seizure issue did not uecessarily indicate disagreement with 
the views of Mn. Jus·rrcE 8'l'hlWAHT and MR. Jus·rrcE REHN-
QUIST. Slip op., at -, n. 1.8 
The state courts, which decided this case before our deci-
sion in Mendenhall, did not consider whether the petitioner 
had been seized. Rather, those courts apparently assumed 
that the stop for routine identification questioning consti-
tuted a seizure, and addressed only the question whether the 
agent's actions were justified by articulable and reasonable 
grounds of suspicion. Because we similarly do not consider 
the initial seizure question in our decision today, that issue 
remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of 
the opinions in Mendenhall. 
8 Mn. JusTICE WHI'l'E, joined by MR. Jus'J'ICE BHENNAN, MR. JusTICE 
MARSHALL, and MH. JusTICE STEVENS, filed a dissPnting opinion in 
Mendenhall in which they concluded that the respondent had been de· 
tained in violation of lhe Fourth Amendment. 
